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THE ASSOCIATIONS of BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ 
CHARACTERISTICS WITH MODIFIED AUDIT OPINION
LAS CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LAS ASOCIACIONES DE LA JUNTA DIRECTIVA CON LA OPINIÓN DE AUDITORÍA MODIFICADA
ABSTRACT
This study aims to find a relationship between board of directors’ characteristics and the likelihood that 
a company receives a modified audit opinion (as a measure of the external reporting of companies) in 
Malaysia. To test our hypotheses, we use the pooled cross-sectional logistic regression analysis for 136 
firm-year observations listed on Bursa Malaysia over the period 2009-2011.The evidence we uncover is 
consistent with the hypotheses that companies with large board size and greater financial expertise of 
the board of directors are less likely to receive a modified audit opinion. The results obtained in this study 
are consistent with the listing rules of the Malaysian-Corporate-Governance Code and the requirements 
of the Bursa Malaysia Corporate-Governance-Guide, which consider and the requirements of the Bursa 
Malaysia Corporate-Governance-Guide, which consider the significance of the board of directors as an 
aspect of good corporate governance and its critical role in the Malaysian financial reporting process. 
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Modified audit opinion, financial reporting quality, board of directors’ characteristics, Malaysia.
RESUMEN
El objetivo de este estudio es investigar, para el caso de Malasia, la relación entre las características de las 
juntas directivas y la probabilidad de que una compañía reciba una opinión de auditoría modificada (como 
una medida de la calidad de la información financiera externa de las compañías). Para probar nuestras 
hipótesis utilizamos 136 observaciones de empresas por año, las cuales están registradas en Bursa Malasia 
para el período 2009-2011, e hicimos un análisis de regresión logística transversal agrupada. La evidencia 
que obtuvimos es consistente con la hipótesis de que las empresas con una junta directiva de gran tamaño 
y mayor capacidad financiera tienen una probabilidad menor de recibir una opinión de auditoría modificada. 
Los resultados hallados en este estudio son consistentes con las reglas del registro del Código de Gobierno 
Corporativo de Malasia y los requisitos de la Guía de Gobierno Corporativo de Bursa Malasia, los cuales 
consideran la importancia de las juntas directivas como uno de los aspectos del buen gobierno corporativo, 
así como su papel fundamental en el reporte de información financiera en Malasia.
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In recent times, a series of giant companies from around the world collapsed, 
including such firms as Enron and WorldCom in the US, Parmalat, Ahold, Gescartera 
and BBVA in Europe (to name a few). It has been shown that most corporate failures 
can be caused by the lack of internal monitoring of management in the financial 
reporting process, arising from poor corporate governance of companies (Agrawal & 
Chadha, 2005; Deng & Wang, 2006; Charitou et al., 2007; Che Haat et al., 2008; Lin 
& Hwang, 2010; Darus & Mohamad, 2011). Malaysia is not an exception, albeit the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) and Bursa Malaysian corporate 
governance Guide strengthens, incrementally, the efforts towards enhancing corporate 
governance. There are still many questionable marks on the financial reporting quality 
since pervasive cases of fraudulent financial reporting and failures (e.g., Megan 
Media Hodlings Berhad, NasionCom Hodlings Berhad, United U-LI Corporation 
Berhad and Transmile Group Berhad) have emerged in the marketplace. Under such 
circumstances, several of these cases were given a modified audit opinion, as the 
result of lower financial reporting quality. Therefore, these cases of corporate financial 
reporting failures have raised questionable marks on the financial reporting quality, 
and the effectiveness of the board of directors, as one of vital internal corporate 
monitoring mechanisms on management in Malaysian setting. As such, this can 
enhance the financial reporting quality (Johari et al., 2008; Darus & Mohamad, 2011). 
Thereby, this study attempts to answer the following question: Does the board of 
directors’ characteristics in individual and aggregated tests (i.e., independence, size, 
meetings and financial expertise) decrease the probability of Malaysian publicly listed 
companies in receiving a modified audit opinion?
  There are several studies that have examined board of directors’ characteristics 
and the possibility of a company receiving a modified audit opinion (Sanchez-
Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005; Firth et al., 2007; Rusmin et al., 2009; Farinha & Viana, 
2009). These studies have uncovered mixed and inconclusive results, due to the 
omission of important determinants (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). Notably, it is well 
documented by the extant research in other disciplines that board of directors’ 
financial expertise is considered one of the crucial factors in increasing the board 
of directors’ effectiveness and monitoring the role that it plays. Consequently, a 
positive impact of the financial expertise of those sitting on the board may enhance 
reporting quality (Carcello et al., 2002; George, 2003; Lin et al., 2003; Park & Shin, 
2004; Bedard et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2008). In this regard, board members with 
financial expertise would be able to rectify potential financial problems before they 
become bigger. As such, the directors who have sufficient expertise in financial 
matters, greater understanding in accounting principles, and are able to ask the 
right questions and understand the answers, will have a positive influence on 
the quality of the financial reporting. Ultimately, the probability of obtaining an 
unmodified audit opinion is increased. 
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  To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, there are several studies that have 
examined the relationship between the board of directors’ characteristics and 
the possibility of a company receiving a modified audit opinion. The Malaysian 
context is not an exceptional one, due to the fact that most Malaysian publicly 
listed companies that have received modified audit opinions, correspond with 
a lower financial reporting quality during our period of study. This circumstance 
raises a questionable mark on the role of the board of directors on the probability 
of Malaysian publicly listed companies receiving a modified audit opinion. A study 
investigating the association of the characteristics of the board of directors with a 
modified audit opinion in the Malaysian setting does not exist. 
In this aspect, the current study is motivated by an effort to fill the gap left by the 
previous audit opinion literature (e.g., Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005; Firth et 
al., 2007; Rusmin et al., 2009; Farinha & Viana, 2009). As to the best of the researchers’ 
knowledge, previous research in the field of audit opinion ignored the influence of 
financial expertise of the board of directors on the probability of receiving a modified 
audit opinion. Therefore, this study seeks to extend the work of Farinha and Viana 
(2009) by empirically investigating how the effectiveness of the board of directors’ 
influence on the probability of receiving a modified audit opinion. This is the 
ultimate measure of financial reporting quality in the economies of Asian countries, 
especially in the Malaysian context. 
In the particular case of the Malaysian context there are few studies that have 
examined the relationship between the board of directors’ characteristics and the 
modified audit opinion (e.g., Alkilani et al., 2019a; 2019b). Therefore, a significant 
aspect of the present study is that of contributing to the understanding of the 
effect of key characteristics of the board of directors on a modified audit opinion in 
Malaysian publicly listed companies. As such, this should fill a gap in the existing 
literature of Asian economies, especially in the Malaysian context, by highlighting 
a specific dimension, namely the quality of financial reports. Additionally, the 
presence of a modified audit opinion can be observed as a direct measure of 
financial reporting quality. Using such a dimension of financial reporting quality, 
we document that, in accordance with our monitoring hypothesis, the financial 
expertise of the board of directors contributes towards improving the effectiveness 
of its monitoring role. Further, by enhancing the quality of financial reporting, we 
uncover that the board of directors with the greatest degree of financial expertise 
is significantly related to companies being able to avoid obtaining a modified audit 
opinion. Moreover, we also find that companies are less likely to receive a modified 
audit opinion when they increase the number of the board members. However, we 
fail to report significant evidence regarding the association of the independent 
non-executive directors and the frequency of board meetings with the modified 
audit opinion. Overall, our results confirm that the financial expertise of the board 
of directors, and the size of the board of directors contribute to increases of the 
Waddah Kamal Hassan Omer · Khaled Salmen Aljaaidi · Mohd ‘Atef Md Yusof · Mohamad Hisyam Selamat
The associations of board of directors’ characteristics with modified audit opinion
8
AD-MINISTER
effectiveness of the board of directors in its monitoring role, related to enhancing 
the quality of the financial reporting which, consequently, leads to a decrease in the 
probability of receiving a modified audit opinion.
The data used in this study are drawn from the annual reports of a sample of 
non-financial Malaysian publicly listed companies which received a modified audit 
opinion from the period 2009 to 2011, as a test sample, with companies receiving 
unmodified audit opinions for the same period such as a matched-pair sample. 
The results of this study should be of interest in providing for a basis for regulatory 
actions, namely those aiming to influence the structure of the board of directors. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Modified Audit Opinion and the Quality of Financial Reporting
The quality of financial reporting indicates the extent to which the financial 
information disseminated through the financial statements gives a true and fair 
view of the financial position, the results of its operations and its cash flows for the 
reporting period (Watkins et al., 2004). Arguably, it is the quality of financial reports 
that is critical to the users of financial reports in so much as they can make the right 
decisions related to investment and finance, as they base their decisions on such 
reports. However, the absence of such quality will eventually lead to the inefficient 
allocation of economic resources, and in turn, poor economic growth, as a result of 
incorrect decisions being made based on misleading financial statements (Gwilliam 
& Macve, 1982; Elliot, 1995; Wallman, 1995, 1996; Sridharan et al., 2002).
In this aspect, financial reporting quality can be judged through the type of 
audit opinion issued by the external auditor (Cohen et al., 2004). The auditor report 
is the final product of the audit examination that auditors use to communicate 
to users of the company’s financial statements (Porter et al., 2003). Thereby, it 
has a major role to play in informing financial statement users of the impending 
problems with the company’s financial reporting or controls of internal processes 
(Hope & Langli, 2010; Bennouri et al., 2015; Chen, 2020). The auditor’s report may 
be classified into two types: unmodified and modified audit opinions (including 
qualified, disclaimed, and adverse opinions), as mentioned in the International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA, 700).
As a measure of financial reporting quality (Pucheta-Martínez & de Fuentes, 
2007; Farinha & Viana, 2009), the type of audit opinion can enhance or decrease 
the reliability of financial information and the integrity of the financial reporting 
process (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Adiloğlu & Vuran, 2011). This is because the 
audit opinion is designed to report the detection of material misstatements in 
audited financial statements (Elfouzi & Zarai, 2009; Stanley et al., 2009; Adiloğlu 
& Vuran, 2011). Thereby, the audit opinion appears through agency theory in 
providing indicators about the company’s quality of financial reports to users of the 
financial statements (e.g., Carcello & Neal, 2000; Hope & Langli, 2010). Specifically, 
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the decision to receive or avoid a modified audit opinion is considered as prima-
facie evidence of the quality of the financial statements (Chen et al., 2001; Pucheta-
Martínez & de Fuentes, 2007; Farinha & Viana, 2009). Whereby, “the modified 
audit report includes a remark related to the quality and presentation of financial 
statements” (Sundgren, 2009). Thus, it can be argued that the modified audit opinion 
can be interpreted as a signal of lower financial reporting quality (Farinha & Viana, 
2009), and may indicate the presence of an agency problem, because the presence 
of a modification; a concern that is central to the user of the financial statements 
(Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005).
Board of Directors Characteristics
The main corporate governance mechanism responsible for monitoring the 
management, is the board of directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). As a result of several 
corporate failures, boards have become a subject of attention for regulators 
(Adams et al., 2010), for governance reform, and a center of concern for the 
attention of many researchers (Omer & Al-Qadasi, 2020; Puni & Anlesinya, 2020). 
The board of directors acts as one of the important internal control mechanisms 
used in increasing public confidence in the credibility and the objectivity of 
financial reports, and protecting shareholder rights (Almutairi & Quttainah, 2020; 
Almujamed & Alfraih, 2020) by enhancing the quality of monitoring process while 
decreasing the probability of receiving a modified audit opinion. The following 
part discusses the development of four hypotheses which meet the objectives of 
the study, and are related to the impact of the effectiveness of the board of directors 
on the probability of receiving a modified audit opinion.
Board Independent Non-Executive Directors
A common contractual means for the mitigating of agency problems and reducing 
its cost is the presence of an independent party to the board for monitoring the 
management and control of company activities (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Cohen et al., 2008; Zainal Abidin et al., 2009; Fernández-Temprano & 
Tejerina-Gaite, 2020). This is because boards are less likely to exert control over 
management when they lack independence from the management (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001). According to Farinha and Viana (2009) and Zhang et al. (2007), 
the presence of independent, non-executive directors on the board is required 
to enhance its effectiveness in overseeing and reviewing the financial reporting 
process, and to introduce better corporate governance practices. (Lagos-Cortés 
et al., 2017; Thenmozhi & Sasidharan, 2020). In line with these arguments, The 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2007) requirement mandates 
that one third of the board members must be independent non-executive directors. 
In tandem, Bursa Malaysia listing requirements stipulate that at least two directors 
or one third of the board, whichever is higher, must be independent (paragraph 
15.02 listing requirements).
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Empirically, previous studies on audit opinion provide some support for the 
notion that independent, non-executive directors will do a better job of oversight 
of financial reporting processes and thus reduce the probability of a company 
receiving a modified audit report. For example: Firth et al. (2007) uncover that the 
existence of independent non-executive directors of the board in a Chinese setting 
have a negative association with a modified audit opinion. Likewise, Farinha and 
Viana (2009) argue that a larger percentage of independent, non-executive directors 
of board members increases the quality of financial reporting, whereby, they 
uncover that the percentage of Portuguese, independent non-executive directors is 
a negative significantly related to a modified audit opinion. Conversely, Rusmin et 
al. (2009) report a negative but insignificant association between the independent, 
non-executive directors and a modified audit opinion in an Australian context. The 
possible explanation of this contradictory finding may be due to the differing sample 
design and the time period of the study test.
In Malaysia, there is only one study (Iskandar et al., 2011) that links the role of the 
board independent, non-executive directors and going concern problems, using data 
from 2004. This study reports a positive insignificant association. It does not seem 
sensible to develop the hypothesis of the present study dependent upon one study 
that has used somewhat old data because of the fact that after 2004, many changes 
have been put in place in the MCCG (MCCG, 2007and Revised MCCG, 2007) and, 
Bursa Malaysia listing requirements, have focused on showing greater clarity of the 
role of the board of directors in the monitoring processes, (among others). This study, 
however, uses recent data from 2009-2011 to examine the impact of the percentage 
of independent, non-executive directors on the board on the modified audit opinion. 
Therefore, this study develops its hypothesis based of the conjuncture of the agency 
theory and the direction of the studies that are consistent with the theory to add one 
more debate to the proposed association. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: There is a negative association between board independent non-executive 
directors and the probability that a company receives a modified audit opinion, all 
else constant.
Board Size
The revised MCCG states that “every board should examine its size, with a view to 
determining the impact of the number upon its effectiveness” (revised MCCG, P, 
12, 2007). In this regard, based on the conjuncture of the agency theory, Kiel and 
Nicholson (2003) argue that a larger board is more likely to be vigilant in addressing 
agency problems. This is because increased board size may increase the monitoring 
strength of the board of directors, due to greater oversight over the company’s 
management (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Borokhovich et al., 2005; Miller, 2009; Marlin 
& Geiger, 2011). In this regard, Al-Najjar (2011) suggests that a large board provides 
for better internal monitoring activities. Hence, board of directors’ size is viewed as 
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another important element in board characteristics that may affect board of directors’ 
effectiveness in monitoring activities, oversighting financial reporting process and 
internal control, which in turn enhances the quality of financial reports (Bradbury et 
al., 2006; Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2006; Zhang et al., 2007; Firth et al., 2007; 
Rusmin et al., 2009). It also reduces the probability of receiving a modified audit 
opinion (Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005; Firth et al., 2007; Rusmin et al., 2009).
  In the audit opinion context, empirical evidence on the impact of the board 
of directors’ size on a modified audit opinion is conflicting and inconclusive. 
Rusmin et al. (2009) uncover a negative and significant association between board 
of directors’ size and modified audit opinion. Implicit in this result is that a large 
number of members on the board enables the board to function effectively and 
leads to high quality of financial reporting, and consequently less likelihood of 
receiving a modified audit opinion. However, this result is in the opposite line with 
Farina and Viana (2009); Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2005) and Firth et al. 
(2007) whereby they find that board directors size is unrelated to the probability 
that a company receives a modified audit opinion. One possible explanation for the 
conflicting results reported is the that listed companies in environments of Spanish, 
Chinese and Portuguese settings have high ownership concentration where a single 
shareholder often has effective control of the company (e.g., Sanchez-Ballesta & 
Garcia-Meca, 2005; Firth et al., 2007; Farinha & Viana, 2009), compared those with 
companies listed in an Australian setting (Rusmin et al., 2009). This may lead to the 
impact of the effectiveness of board of directors’ size as a monitoring device on the 
corporate financial reporting process, and its capacity to monitor management.
Due to the above arguments and the limited evidence, this study attempts to 
examine the impact of the board size on the modified audit opinion in Malaysian 
context. Therefore, the study develops it hypothesis based on the suggestion of the 
agency theory and the direction of the studies that are consistent with the theory to 
add one more debate to the proposed relationship. Thus the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
H2: There is a negative association between board of directors’ size and the 
probability that a company receives a modified audit opinion, all else constant.
Board Meetings
The board of directors’ meetings is considered as a resource that leads to board 
diligence and in turn enhances board effectiveness (Conger et al., 1998; Vafeas, 1999; 
Xie et al., 2003; Garcı´a Lara et al., 2009). Overall, the intensity of board activities is 
likely to contribute to the effectiveness of its oversighting function particularly in 
matters concerning the financial reporting process, resulting in improved financial 
reporting quality (Xie et al., 2003; Yatim et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2007; Alshirah et al., 
2020). In turn, there is a decrease in the probability of receiving a modified audit 
opinion (Farinha & Viana, 2009). Hence, the meetings of the board of directors 
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appears to have the capability to minimizes agency problems and reduce agency 
cost, as a result from lower information asymmetry (Foo & Mat Zain, 2010; Lorca et al., 
2011). Consistent with these perspectives, the latest Guide on Corporate Governance 
by Bursa Malaysia highlights that a typical board of directors would hold a minimum 
of 6 to 8 board meetings annually. 
Regarding the influences of the board of directors’ meetings on a modified 
audit opinion, prior empirical studies are still small in number and provide an 
unclear result to support theoretical arguments. For example, Farinha and Viana 
(2009) report that the increase of the board of directors’ meetings increases the 
quality of financial reporting and reduces the probability of receiving a modified 
audit opinion. However, this result is contrary with Firth et al. (2007) whereby 
they suggest that the relationship between board diligence (proxy by the board of 
directors’ meetings) and the issuance of a modified audit opinion is not statistically 
significant. The potential justification of these paradoxical results might be due to 
the different corporate governance structure. Chinese listed companies have a two-
tier internal corporate governance structure made up of a supervisory board and a 
board of directors (e.g., Firth et al., 2007). The supervisory board oversees the board 
of directors and this governance structure differs from the Portuguese corporate 
governance structure (e.g., Farinha & Viana, 2009).
Thus, based on the standpoint of the agency theory, it can be argued that the 
increase of the board of directors’ meetings will likely improve the monitoring 
process of corporate financial reporting and internal control; thereby, an increase in 
the probability of an unmodified audit opinion (Farinha & Viana, 2009). Therefore, 
the hypothesis is developed based on the proposition of the agency theory and 
the direction of the studies that are in line with the theory to add one more related 
debate. Thus the following hypothesis is proposed:
H3: There is a negative association between board of directors’ meetings and the 
probability that a company receives a modified audit opinion, all else constant.
Board of Directors’ Financial Expertise
Cohen et al. (2008) suggest that the primary characteristic for a board member 
in the agency perspective is expertise in monitoring and control. In this regard, 
previous studies argue that board of directors’ financial expertise has an important 
impact on its effectiveness in its monitoring role and how this, consequently, can 
influence the quality of financial reporting (Lin et al., 2003; George, 2003; Xie et al., 
2003; Bedard et al., 2004; Park & Shin, 2004; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005). Therefore, the 
board of directors, which has more experts is more likely to discharge its oversight 
responsibility effectively in the internal control and financial reporting process, thus 
sustaining the quality of financial reporting, and eventually increasing the probability 
of receiving an unmodified audit opinion.
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To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, there is no empirical study that has 
linked board of directors’ financial expertise and modified audit opinion. Prior 
literature highlights the importance of addressing different board of directors’ 
characteristics as the crucial factors in increasing board of directors’ effectiveness 
and the monitoring role it plays (Xie et al., 2003; Lin et al., 2003; Agrawal & Chadha, 
2005; Goh, 2009). It is therefore logical to think that the increase in expertise of the 
board of directors on financial matters leads to an increase its understanding of the 
accounting numbers. This enables them to ask the right questions and to be abler to 
understand the answers, thus increasing the board’s ability to monitor management 
while enhancing internal control and financial report quality. This, consequently, 
reduces the probability of receiving a modified audit opinion, and thereby contributes 
to protecting the interest of all shareholders.
This study develops it hypothesis based on the suggestion of the agency theory 
and the direction of the studies that are consistent with the theory to add one more 
debate to the proposed association. Thus the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: There is a negative association between board of director expertise and the 
probability that a company receives a modified audit opinion, all else constant.
METHODOLOGY
Data Collection and Sample Description
Data used in this study are collected from two separate sources: annual reports and 
Datastream. Any missing financial figures from Datastream were acquired from the 
annual reports. The annual reports were retrieved from the Bursa Malaysia website 
at www.bursamalaysia.com.my. All relevant data was collected from 2009 to 2011. 
The sample companies were extracted from the population of publicly-available 
information mainly annual reports of publicly listed companies on the Bursa Malaysia, 
which received a modified audit opinion in the period of 2009-2011, as a test sample. 
Each firm year of the test sample is matched with a company which received an 
unmodified audit opinion as a control test (matched-pair sample) in the event year. 
In this study, the matched-pair sample is identified using the following criteria: fiscal 
year, industry, same market and nearest total asset amount. The matched-pair sample 
method has been used in prior studies of audit opinion such as Sanchez-Ballesta and 
Garcia-Meca (2005). In this study, the financial companies were excluded because 
they possess unique characteristics, and since they are not required to adopt some of 
the corporate governance requirements imposed on public companies, and most are 
regulated by different regulations and standards they would thus require a separate 
study, (Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005; Chu & Cheah, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; 
Farinha & Viana, 2009). Given the above, our sample is composed of 136 company-
years observations relating to 96 companies from 7 different industries sectors. This 
can be more pronounced as will show later.
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Model Specification and Measurement
To examine the relationship between independent variables and modified audit 
opinion, we test our hypothesis by using the following cross-sectional logistic 
regression model which is proposed as: 
MAO = β0 + β1 BINEDR + β2 BSIZE + β3 BMEET + β4 BEXPERT + β5 
AUDSIZE + β6 logAUDLAG + β7 LOSS + β8 NCFGOAR + β9 LogEAF + e 
Where: 
Modified audit opinion (MAO) will take the value of “1” if the opinion is a modified 
one, i.e., when a qualified, disclaimed, and adverse opinions has been issued by the 
auditor, and “0” otherwise.
The independent variables are defined as follows:
BINEDR = percentage of independent non-executive directors 
on the board;
BSIZE = number of board members at fiscal year-end;
BMEET = number of board meetings during the fiscal year-
end;
BEXPERT = percentage of the board of directors with 
accounting and financial expertise;
AUDSIZE = dummy variable will take the value of 1 if company 
was audited by a Big 4 audit firm, 0 otherwise;
logAUDLAG = the natural logarithm represents the number of 
days elapsing between the end of the fiscal year 
of the company to the completion of the audit for 
the current year for each individual firm (the audit 
report date);
LOSS = dummy variable will take the value of 1 if the 
company reported a negative net income in either 
or both of the two previous years; 0 otherwise;
NCFGOAR = percentage of net cash flow generated from 
operating activities (net cash flow generated from 
operating activities divided by total assets);
LogEAF = Log of external audit fees.
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Control variables
There are many factors that affect a modified audit opinion. In our model we have 
introduced several of these factors as controlling variables, among others, which 
have been reported in the literature, which can impact the probability that a company 
receives a modified audit opinion. Hence, this study seeks to analyze the relationship 
between a modified audit opinion and a comprehensive set of control variables. The 
discussions of other controlled variables are offered in the following:
Most prior archival studies have documented that the audit firm size (AUDSIZE), 
audit report lag (AUDLAG), the losses (LOSS), the operating cash flow (NCFGOAR) 
and the statutory external audit fees (EAF) are significantly associated with 
modified audit opinion. Hence, these variables are included as control because this 
is uncovered to exert a significant influence on modified audit opinion. In this study, 
with regard to the audit firm size and the operating cash flow it is expected to have a 
negative association with a modified audit opinion (Pucheta-Martínez & de Fuentes, 
2007; Firth, et al., 2007; Goh, 2009; Farinha & Viana, 2009; Rahmat et al., 2009; Kaplan 
& Williams, 2013; Tsipouridou & Spathis, 2014; Moalla & Baili 2019). In respect to the 
audit report lag (AUDLAG), the losses (LOSS), and the statutory external audit fees 
(EAF) are expected to have a positive relationship, with a modified audit opinion 
(Francis, 1984; Chen & Church, 1992; Bell et al., 2001; Behn et al., 2001; DeFond et al., 
2002; Geiger & Rama, 2003; Pucheta-Martínez & de Fuentes, 2007; Firth et al., 2007; 
Johl et al., 2007; Basioudis et al., 2008; Farinha & Viana, 2009; Malek & Che Ahmad, 
2011; Johl et al., 2012; Kaplan & Williams, 2013; Tsipouridou & Spathis, 2014; Moalla, 
2017; Sultanoglu et al.2018; Alkilani et al., 2019a; Alkilani et al., 2019b; Moalla and 
Baili 2019). Therefore, the companies are expected to be received an unmodified 
audit opinion when the companies have high quality auditors, shorter audit report 
lag, strong financial health, appropriate net cash flow generated from operating 
activities, and suitable audit services fee paid by the company to its statutory 
external auditor on audit engagement.
Sample Descriptive
After the screening process, 68 company-years observations relating to 48 
companies that have received a modified audit opinion were eligible to be included 
in the analysis as a test sample group. The test sample group companies were 
matched with the same number of companies that have received an unmodified 
audit opinion, resulting in a final sample of 136 company-years observations 
relating to 96 companies. 
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Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses 
Table 1: provides descriptive statistics and univariate test results for variables 
measured as continuous metrics. In this table, summary statistics for the total groups 
of sample, modified audit opinion (test sample) and unmodified audit opinion (the 
matched-pair sample) as a control test sample are tabled in separate columns. 
Regarding the independent, non-executive directors on the board, the mean 
(median) of BINEDR is .464 (.43); with a minimum of .29 and a maximum of .80, 
suggesting that independent non-executive directors on the board are very much 
closer to half of the board of directors’ members in total groups of the sample. 
This composition follows the suggestion made by the MCCG which requires at 
least one-third (1/3) of the board members to be independent non-executive. In 
audit opinion studies, these results are similar to the mean (median) of .36 (.40) 
reported in Portuguese for 2002-2005 by Farinha and Viana (2009). Comparing the 
mean (median) of BINEDR in modified audit opinion sample is .492 (.50); which 
is significantly higher when compared with the mean (median) .435 (.43) of an 
unmodified audit opinion (the matched-pair sample).
In contrast, we can observe that the mean (median) board of directors’ size BSIZE 
is 6.856 (7) members; with a minimum of 3 and maximum of 13, in total groups of the 
sample. In comparing terms with audit opinion studies, Farinha and Viana (2009) 
uncover that the mean (median) of board of directors’ size BSIZE in their study is 
7.51 (7). In the comparative, the mean (median) of BSIZE in a modified audit opinion 
sample is 6.33 (6); which is significantly lower when compared with the mean 
(median) 7.38 (7) of an unmodified audit opinion (the matched-pair sample).
Concerning the frequency of meetings of the board of directors, we can observe 
that the mean (median) number of board of directors’ meetings BMEET is 6.053 (5) 
(minimum of 3 and maximum of 25), in total groups of the sample. These values 
contrast to those obtained from Farinha and Viana (2009), as they uncover that the 
mean (median) number of boards of director meetings is 13.78 (12) with a minimum 
of 3 and maximum of 58 meetings. One can observe that the mean (median) of 
BMEET in a modified audit opinion sample is 7.27 (6); which is significantly higher 
when compared with the mean (median) 4.83 (5) of an unmodified audit opinion 
(the matched-pair sample).
In terms of the board of directors’ financial expertise, we find that the mean 
(median) of the board of directors’ financial expertise BEXPERT is .303 (.29) 
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(minimum of 0 and maximum of .80), in the total groups of the sample. The 
mean (median) of BEXPERT in modified audit opinion sample is .304 (.29) which 
is quite similar when compared with the mean (median) of an unmodified audit 
opinion (the matched-pair sample) .302 (.29) and the total groups of samples .303 
(.29). Comparing the BEXPERT in the two groups of audit opinion (modified audit 
opinion with that of unmodified audit opinion) it shows a statistically insignificant 
difference between the mean of the board of directors’ financial expertise BEXPERT 
in the two groups (t = .096 p = .924). This preliminary result does not provide 
directional support for the association of the board of directors’ financial expertise 
with a modified audit opinion.
  Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and univariate test results for (dummy) 
variables by audit opinion. Like the previous t-test, the analysis in this table is related 
to the relationship between modified audit opinion and unmodified audit opinion in 
order to be consistent with the multivariate model. The results of the Mann-Whitney 
U-test for the distribution differences between modified audit opinion and unmodified 
audit opinion reveals that audit firm size AUDSIZE, is statistically insignificant. In this 
case, we can argue that these variables are statistically independent from the type of 
opinion being granted by the auditor (at the 10% level of significance). This result 
indicates that no evidence of significant differences exists between the two groups of 
audit opinion samples for audit firm size AUDSIZE, (modified audit opinion group: 
.43; an unmodified audit opinion group: .57).
  Based on our observation, a majority of our sample was audited by the Non-BIG 
4 audit firms (63%), which reported that the modified audit opinion group audited 
by (BIG 4: .32; Non-BIG 4: .68) and an unmodified audit opinion group audited by 
(BIG 4: .42; Non-BIG 4: .58). This is inconsistent with previous studies such as Farinha 
and Viana (2009) who reported that the Big 4 auditors are responsible, directly or 
through subsidiaries, for about 70% of the audit reports in Portugal.
  Meanwhile, the differences in loss in previous years LOSS samples was found to 
be highly significant at p < .000. This result is consistent with prior audit reporting 
research (Johl et al., 2007; Firth et al., 2007; Pucheta-Martínez & de Fuentes, 2007; 
Farinha & Viana, 2009), the modified audit opinion group were more likely to have a 
loss and more likely to have received a modified audit opinion than the unmodified 
audit opinion group.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and univariate test results of continuous variables classified by 
modified audit opinion/unmodified audit opinion
Total Groups of Sample
Test sample (the 
recipients of 
modified. A.O)
Control test sample 
(the recipients of 
Unmodified. A.O)


































































BINEDR .464 .43 .29 .80 12773 .492 .50 .130 .435 .43 .11959 2.619 .010
BSIZE 6.856 7 3 13 1.722 6.33 6 1.439 7.38 7 1.829 -3.649 .000
BMEET 6.053 5 3 25 3.092 7.27 6 3.801 4.83 5 1.343 4.916 .000
BEXPERT .303 .29 0 .80 .145 .304 .29 .150 .302 .29 .141 .096 .924
logAUDLAG 4.655 4.754 3.912 4.942 .211 4.762 4.779 .069 4.547 4.635 .248 6.805 000
NCFGOAR .578 .036 -1.73 36.696 4.404 -.030 .003 .234 1.185 .084 6.187 -1.594 .113
LogEAF 4.989 4. 963 3.90 6.42 .401 4.975 4.977 .391 5.002 4.937 .413 -.399 .690
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (percentage) and univariate test results for dummy 
variables for modified audit opinion /unmodified audit opinion
Variables
Modified
Type of audit opinion Mann-Whitney 
U-testUnmodified
AUDSIZE
BIG 4 21 (43%) 28 (57%)
.209Non-BIG 
4 45 (54%) 38 (46%)
LOSS
Loss 48 (76%) 18 (24%)
.000
UnLoss 9 (16%) 57 (84%)
Regarding the existence of multicollinearity problems among the independent 
variables, several examinations have been identified to check for the possible 
existence of multicollinearity. These include: the correlation matrix, variance inflation 
factor (VIF) and tolerance (1/VIF).
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In terms of the correlation matrix, in this study, the correlation matrixes confirm 
that no multicollinearity exists among the variables in the study model, the modified 
audit opinion model as none of the variables correlates equal or above 0.80, which 
is the first indication to absence of a substantial collinearity problem between the 
independent variables (Hair et al., 1995; Greene, 1999; Cooper & Schindler, 2003). 
Among independent variables, the highest correlation is equal to -0.501, that found 
for BSIZE and BINEDR in modified audit opinion; All the variables have a correlation 
that are below the critical limits of 0.80. As shown in Table 3. This provides for 
indications that multicollinearity is not a problem in the study model estimations.




































BMEET 0.115 -0.102 1
BEXPERT 0.148 -0.175 0.069 1
AUDSIZE -0.118 0.220 -0.095 0.001 1
logAUDLAG 0.228 -0.242 0.222 -0.039 -0.294 1
LOSS 0.179 -0.207 0.323 0.055 -0.122 0.371 1
NCFGOAR -0.1163 0.342 -0.051 -0.006 0 .169 -0.382 -0.026 1
LogEAF -0.173 0.286 0.062 0.001 0.251 -0.093 0.019 0.439 1
  
With regard to the (VIF) and the tolerance (1/VIF), in general, the existence of 
multicollinearity problems is detected if the variance inflation factors (VIF) is more 
than 10 and tolerance value is less than 0.10 (Hair et al., 2006; Pallant, 2007). Based 
on the analyses, variance inflation factors (VIF) and the tolerance (1/VIF) for the 
study model report in this study do not exceed (10) and (0.10), respectively. As 
shown in Table 4. This indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem to model the 
explanation in this study.
Waddah Kamal Hassan Omer · Khaled Salmen Aljaaidi · Mohd ‘Atef Md Yusof · Mohamad Hisyam Selamat
The associations of board of directors’ characteristics with modified audit opinion
20
AD-MINISTER
Table 4. Multicollinearity statistics of assessing VIF and Tolerance 

















MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS
The results of multivariate logistic regression for testing the hypotheses are illustrated 
in Table 5. We uncover that the model correctly classifies approximately 86.4 of the 
observations. In this respect, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistics is greater than 0.05 
for the study model (0.948) indicating that study model fit is acceptable. Moreover, 
the relationship between dependent and independent variables is significant (X2 = 
106.40, p < 0.000). The pseudo X2 = (0.5815) implies a relatively strong association 
between the dependent and independent variables. In terms of the Cox and Snell R2 
value for the study model is (0.553) indicating that the model fit. The Nagelkerke R2 
values for the study model is (0.738). This is indicating that the independent variables 
in the model explain 73.8% of the change in the dependent variable, implying a 
reasonably explanatory model.
The presence some of outliers in the dataset amongst independent variables may 
mislead the results significantly obtained through the logistic regression and thus 
must be considered for treatment (Menard, 2002). In this respect, there are several 
ways to identify outliers. In this study, to ascertain whether the results are driven 
by unusual sample observations, outliers were identified using the standardized 
residual values greater than +/− about 3.3 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013; Pallant, 2007). 
Accordingly, in this study, there is some outliers, only a few (two) of them. Thus, such 
observations had been excluded from the main analysis. Eliminating this observation 
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together with its unmodified audit opinion matched group enhances the regression 
results as presented in the following Table 5.
 This is demonstrated even though The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(2000, 2007) emphasized the importance of independent, non-executive directors 
on the board to bring an independent judgment to the board and enhance its 
effectiveness (Ponnu & Karthigeyan, 2010). The results show that the relationship 
between the independent, non-executive directors and modified audit opinion is a 
negative, but not statistically significant even at the 10% level. The result implies 
that the Malaysian independent non-executive directors may not be enough to act 
as an effective monitoring mechanism (Darus & Mohamad, 2011), in order to avoid 
companies from obtaining a modified audit opinion. Hence, it can be inferred that 
hypothesis H1 is rejected. This result is consistent with the finding of Rusmin et al. 
(2009) who report a negative insignificant association between the independent non-
executive directors and a modified audit opinion. Likewise, in a local context, Iskandar 
et al. (2011) suggest that the association between the Malaysian independent, non-
executive directors and going concern problems is a positive insignificant.
A plausible explanation for this result, perhaps, is that these independent non-
executive directors as a part of the board of directors, might have a lack of time and 
insufficient efforts to carry out their duties to monitor financial reporting quality. This 
is because the board members may be holding more directorships; consequently, they 
are associated with ineffective monitoring of management (e.g., Fich & Shivdasani 
2006). Specifically, directors with multiple directorships may have limited dedicated 
time to one company, thus directors with multiple directorships become so busy, and 
may have less time to closely scrutinize the internal control system, which leads to 
less effectiveness in monitoring of management (Yatim, 2011; Kamardin et al., 2012).
Regarding the influence of the board of directors’ size on the likelihood of receiving 
a modified audit opinion, our results show a significant negative relationship between 
the large directors on the board and a modified audit opinion at the 5% level. Implicit 
in this result suggests that a large number of members on the board of directors 
enable them to function effectively and provide better internal monitoring activities; 
and consequently, decrease the probability of Malaysian publicly listed companies 
in obtaining a modified audit opinion. We can therefore conclude that our evidence 
expected H2. This result is consistent with Rusmin et al. (2009) who find that the 
board of directors’ size is a negative and is related to the probability that a company 
is receiving a modified audit opinion.
Contrary to the stated hypothesis, the study finds a statistically significant 
relationship at the 1% level, but with the positively associated direction between 
board of director meetings with a modified audit opinion. This result indicates 
that the frequent meetings of board of directors do not help reduce the likelihood 
of Malaysian publicly listed companies receiving a modified audit opinion. Hence, 
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it can be inferred that hypothesis H3 is unsupported. This result is opposing with 
the suggestion of empirically indicated research for a modified audit opinion; for 
example,, Farinha and Viana (2009) report that the board of director meetings has a 
negative impact on a modified audit opinion. 
Thus, a plausible interpretation from this result may be based on the fact that 
the increase in the board of directors meetings meant that holding additional 
meetings and spending more time with dealing with the company problems, 
discussing strategy and legal issues, does not mean spending more time towards 
discussing the financial reporting issues or provide for a better monitoring role 
for the financial reporting processes. In addition, as a result of a lower quality of 
financial reporting there is therefore an increase in the propensity of Malaysian 
publicly listed companies in receiving a modified audit opinion. Therefore, the 
company needs to ensure that board of directors’ members raised and resolved 
issues with management during these meetings, and as a result improve the quality 
of reporting (Hashim & Abdul Rahman, 2011).
In terms of the board of directors’ financial expertise, the results show that 
the board of directors’ financial expertise has a negative statistically significant 
relationship at the 10% level with the probability that companies receive a modified 
audit opinion. This result indicates that the increase of financial expertise on the 
board of directors leads to an increase in its understanding of accounting matters, 
which enables them to contribute towards improving its effective monitoring role, 
and in turn, enhance the quality of financial reporting and thereby, increase the 
probability of Malaysian publicly listed companies receiving an unmodified audit 
opinion. This is consistent with the theoretical model and the stated hypothesis. 
Hence, it can be inferred that hypothesis H4 is supported. 
In regard to control variables, as expected in the study model all the control 
variables are significant in the predicted directions except for audit firm size 
AUDSIZE and external audit fees LogEAF, which are insignificant with the modified 
audit opinion. More specifically, there is an insignificant positive relationship 
between audit firm size AUDSIZE and the modified audit opinion even at the 10% 
level. As unpredicted, this finding reveals that the audit firm size does not bring any 
sort improvement in the monitoring processes, towards enhancing the quality of 
financial reporting, and in turn impact the likelihood of Malaysian publicly listed 
companies receiving an unmodified audit opinion. This result is consistent with 
numerous empirical previous studies on modified audit opinion; for instance, Firth 
et al. (2007), Pucheta-Martínez and de Fuentes (2007) and Farinha and Viana (2009) 
which uncover a positive insignificant association between the audit firm size and 
the modified audit opinion. Likewise, in the local context, Malek and Che Ahmad 
(2011) find that the size of an audit firm is negatively but not significantly related to 
an unqualified audit opinion.
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The same applies as well to the external audit fees, as unexpected; there is an 
insignificant positive relationship between external audit fees LogEAF and the 
modified audit opinion even at the 10% level. This result reveals that the external 
audit fees do not bring any sort improvement in the monitoring processes, towards 
enhancing the quality of financial reporting, and in turn impact the probability of 
Malaysian publicly listed companies receiving an unmodified audit opinion. This 
result reinforces the findings of prior local studies; for illustration, Johl et al. (2012) 
uncover that the qualified audit report is a negative unrelated to natural logarithm of 
audit fees. Likewise, Malek and Che Ahmad (2011) find that the external audit fee is a 
positively but insignificant related to an unqualified audit opinion.
  Nevertheless, we uncover a positive and highly significant (at p < 0.01) 
association between both audit report lag logAUDLAG and the losses LOSS and 
the likelihood probability of receiving a modified audit opinion. Also, in accordance 
with expectations of the influence operating cash flow, our evidence finds that the 
percentage of net cash flow generated from operating activities NCFGOAR has a 
negative significantly impact on the probability of receiving a modified audit opinion 
(In the study Model: p < 0.01).
Table 5. Results of the multivariate logistic regression Modified audit opinion Model
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LR chi2 (9; 6) 106.40




Correctly Classified (%) 86.4
No. of Observations 132
All p-values are one-tailed significance. *** are significant at p<0.01, ** 
are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We draw on the argument that board of directors’ acts are one of the important 
internal control mechanisms used in increasing public confidence in the credibility 
and the objectivity of financial reports through its effectiveness in overseeing of the 
corporate financial reporting process, and contribute to the protection of the interests 
of all shareholders. This study seeks to investigate the association between the effect 
of the characteristics of the board of directors and the probability that a company 
receives a modified audit opinion, as a measure of the quality of companies external 
financial reporting. Using a logistic regression with a matched pair sample design, 
we analyze the data of the sample of 136 observations relating to 96 non-financial 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia over the period 2009-2011.
In this study several important findings emerge. Firstly, based on the study 
Model relating to an individual test for independent variables, our results provide 
evidence that Malaysian directors on the board with large size and greater expertise 
in financial matters are more effective in monitoring the financial accounting 
process, and ensuring the reliability of financial reports that, in turn, decrease the 
probability of Malaysian public listed companies receiving a modified audit opinion. 
In so doing, this contributes to protecting the interests of all shareholders. Therefore, 
the results indicate that board of directors’ size and financial expertise are two of the 
most important determinants of a modified audit opinion, and reflect good internal 
control practices in a Malaysian setting.
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However, the insignificant relationship between the percentage of the 
independent, non-executive directors and the probability of Malaysian publicly listed 
companies obtaining a modified audit opinion indicates that the independence of the 
Malaysian directors may not be sufficient to protect the interest of all shareholders. 
This is because of the fact that the independent, non-executive directors as a part of 
the board of directors, might have a lack of time and insufficient efforts to carry out 
their duties to monitor financial reporting quality, due to the board members being 
busier. Arguably, directors’ busyness reduces their effectiveness in their monitoring 
duties as they relate to executive duties and the monitoring of financial reporting 
quality (Song & Windram, 2004; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Chang, 2009; Yatim, 2011; 
Kamardin et al., 2012).
  Moreover, while it is expected that board of directors’ meetings will be able 
to reduce the likelihood that a company receives a modified audit opinion as 
documented in Farinha and Viana (2009), this study uncovers a controversial and 
positive direction between the frequency of meetings of board of directors with the 
modified audit opinion. As such, this may reflect some concerns that more frequent 
meetings of board of directors as an internal corporate governance mechanism may 
not be able to necessarily provide a better monitoring role to the financial reporting 
processes in companies. Thus, the company needs to ensure board of directors’ 
members raise and resolve issues with management during such meetings, and as a 
result, improve the quality of reporting (Hashim & Abdul Rahman, 2011).
  The results of this study provide comprehensive evidence to support the 
agency theory. In this aspect, it can be argued that the significantly negative 
associations reported between that the board of directors’ financial expertise 
and board of directors’ size with a modified audit opinion are proportionate to 
the suggestion of the agency theory. Because of a significant negative association 
between the size and financial expertise of the board of directors with a modified 
audit opinion, it indicates that an increase in the effectiveness of the board of 
directors enhances the quality of companies external financial reporting. In turn, 
this mitigates the agency problems between the financial statement users and 
safeguards the shareholders’ interests by decreasing the prospect of Malaysian 
public listed companies receiving a modified audit opinion.
The results of this study could be valuable to management, shareholders, 
auditors, creditors and investors who are concerned about improving the practices of 
corporate governance, and the quality of financial reporting in the Malaysian market. 
This is because they have a  better understanding of  how the board of directors’ 
characteristics impact the modified audit opinion. 
Likewise, as with other studies, this study is subject to a number of limitations. 
Foremost, the results obtained in this study based on the data collected from annual 
reports of the sample of 136 observations relating to 96 non-financial companies 
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listed on Bursa Malaysia, which only covers a three-year period from 2009 until 20011. 
Thereby, our study limits the ability to generalize the results across companies (i.e., 
in other sectors), years (a longer year data period would show the trend on a modified 
audit opinion) and other countries (due to a different structure of ownership and 
regulations). In addition, providing a strong statistical power in explaining the 
test results depends on the sample size in which a small sample size may fail to 
provide such power. Secondly, we focused on a few aspects of the board of directors’ 
characteristics. Clearly there may be other characteristics of the board of directors 
that could affect the results, such as the legal expertise, ethnicity (indigenous vs 
non-indigenous) and business knowledge (industry expertise), which may have an 
influence on a modified audit opinion. Thirdly, there might be other variables that 
impact the probability of receiving a modified audit opinion that are not included 
in this study, such as the characteristics of the audit committee and the ownership 
structure. Future studies possibly will address these issues. Additionally, currently, as 
a result of the prevailing global conditions resulting from the pandemic (Covid-19), 
which has had a major impact on the global economy, extending this study by using 
data on companies in these exceptional circumstances in future studies is important 
to determine if there are any differences in the results. 
Despite these limitations, the results uncovered in this study provides some 
preliminary evidence that a modified audit opinion is associated with the financial 
expertise of the board of directors and the size of the board of directors. This 
study confirms that the board of directors’ characteristics are considered as a 
good internal monitoring mechanism in mitigating the agency conflicts, and in 
protecting the interests of shareholders among Malaysian companies. In doing 
so, the results of this study provide strong evidence to support the current debate 
on the effectiveness of the board of directors’ characteristics as one of an internal 
corporate  governance mechanism in the context of Malaysia, and constitute a 
further contribution to modified audit opinion studies while narrowing the gap in 
respect to the accountancy literature.
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